ON WATCH: The proof of success

Both Federal and State governments continue to claim the Niger Delta amnesty an unequivocal success. The public would have more confidence in the success of the amnesty if it had some clear means of gauging success. Of course there is the obvious measure which is a lack of conflict. But this is a day-to-day matter where one simply hopes that each new day brings another day of peace. With the passage of time the public confidence gradually grows.

The government rejected the many calls for independent verification of the disarmament process, weapons custody and destruction process, the surrender of non-state forces. Unfortunately with the rejection of any form of independent verification also went the simplest means of establishing credibility and success of the amnesty.

The number of persons accepting the amnesty is not a proof of success. It seems that in the final days of the amnesty offer there was a sudden rush to take up the offer and there are questions as to whether all those availing themselves of the amnesty offer were militants or simply unemployed youth who saw an opportunity for training and being funded. If you are unemployed and scratching hard to eke out a meagre existence wouldn't you be attracted by an offer to receive training plus N65, 000 per month? The situation is made all the more ridiculous when we consider that a police constable only receives N35, 000 per month. Does this mean we value criminality more than the guardians of public safety?

There is one other tool the government could have used to establish confidence that the amnesty process would result in peace and that is transparency. The Federal Government has consistently denied that any funds have been paid either to former combatants to secure their agreement to surrender or for their weapons and yet we have the boys very openly stating that they have been promised funds.

In Bayelsa State the former militants have even taken to the streets to protest about the promised funds.

Governor Sylva has paid vast sums to militia leaders not to attack sites in Bayelsa State and then paid vast sums to entice Boyloaf to surrender (Next:Cold Cash for Silent Guns 25 October 2009). This is reminiscent of the Italian Government clandestinely paying the Taliban in the Sarobi area west of Kabul in order to keep the area free of conflict. When the payments were discontinued and the French took over responsibility for maintaining peace in the area the Taliban quickly dealt the French troops a stunning blow. The French had been unaware of the Italian arrangement and did not pay the Taliban.

In the interests of transparency the state governments could declare the amounts they have paid to former combatants and the amounts paid for weapons. This is quite apart from amounts paid to train and employ former combatants which should be declared as part of each state's public expenditure.

The Federal Government has maintained that it does not require any external verification. It maintains the amnesty process is a domestic matter yet it wants the world to believe that all is now well and thus foreign investment can once again flow into the Niger Delta. In the interests of establishing credibility for the process and building both the local public and international confidence in the amnesty the Federal Government could publish a full list of weapons surrendered and the serial numbers of the weapons as part of its verification programme.

The state governments could similarly publish details of all programmes related to retraining and employment of former combatants, capacity building of the police force.

Without independent verification and without any semblance of transparency in the process the public is left with only the option to wait for the passing of each day until such an amount of time has passed without any major outbreak of conflict that it can be said with confidence, "We have peace".

Other governments and international bodies can take this opportunity of a cessation of conflict to work with the Federal Government of Nigeria to reduce the level of small arms entering Nigeria, the transport and refining of illegal oil, laundering of cash, and strengthening of national and state government capacity to address critical issues such as law and order, governance, electoral practices, fighting corruption, reform and training of police and security forces.

At the moment we have an end to the conflict. We must wait to see if we have peace.