If the public's response to the sack by the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) of five bank directors last week is anything to go by, then Mr. Sanusi Lamido Sanusi, the bank's new governor, might be on to something. The jury will be out for a while yet on the ethical weight to accord these developments, but not many will challenge their seismic importance. From denying just a few months back that impaired loans could be a major problem, to concerted efforts at playing down the systemic significance of these "toxic assets", banks have moved pretty rapidly during the current financial year to make provisions for credit extended in relation to the last bubble in the stock market, which may no longer be recoverable. The euphemisms deployed to explain the size and sudden emergence of these "exceptional items" in the few annual reports that have been released are hilarious at best.
Less risible is the fact that these "items" draw attention to a more serious detail. The subtle point made here is that Nigeria is not failing because the laws and regulations necessary for success are lacking. It is instead punching way below its weight in every possible department, because a few of our compatriots are able to act in utter disregard of the law; and then get away with it. While we're on the subject, it helps to note that the legal structure of the joint stock company plays strongly to this disadvantage.
Joseph Schumpeter's description of the process resulting from capitalism's substitution of "a mere parcel of shares for the wealth of and the machines in a factory" remains one of the stronger indictments against the capitalist mode of production. Not just does this "process" take "the life out of the idea of property"; the "dematerialised, defunctionalised, and absentee ownership does not impress or call forth moral allegiance as the vital form of property did". Schumpeter did imagine that "eventually, there would be nobody left who really cares to stand for it (capitalism)", because the process of dematerialisation loosens the "grip from property which previously drove the holder of a title to it to fight, economically, physically, politically for ‘his' factory and his control over it, to die if necessary on its steps".
To put it simply, the point is that the putative owners of Nigerian banks - the shareholders - haven't the foggiest idea about what goes on in those ‘hallowed' premises. More bothersome is the possibility that they may not even care.
To their credit, the banks, on account of the mouth-watering returns they have declared in recent times, have contributed immensely to the development of a shareholding culture in the country; but, because of their very recent introduction to this responsibility, these shareholders are singularly unsuited to the governance responsibility accruing to their "parcel of shares". For a great many of them, it is not uncommon to find a strong faith in the central bank's responsibility for ensuring that these banks are properly run, which truly is more appropriate to the expectations of depositors enjoying deposit insurance.
We have seen only too graphically in the last one year how pernicious the feedback loop between the financial sector and the rest of the economy can be, when it turns negative. Sadly, ultimate responsibility for the management of these institutions still lies with shareholders, through their proxies, the board of directors.
Now, because executive management has the largest window of opportunity when it comes to driving dodgy practices, the responsibility for ensuring that it is denied the incentive to do so lies with the non-executive members of the boards of directors. But how much of the nature of risks taken by these institutions in recent times did the non-executive members of the boards of directors of Nigerian banks really understand? And how much power did they have to restrain managements with excessive risk appetites?
In this environment, Lord Walker, in his July 16 2009 "review of corporate governance in UK banks and other financial industry entities", believes; "the most critical need is for an environment in which effective challenge of the executive is expected and achieved in the board room before decisions are taken on major risk and strategic issues". The key lesson, apparently, is that an excessively dominant chief executive officer is as distasteful as a board peopled by quislings.


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